|СОИ страт обор инициатива|
|1||The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was proposed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983 to use ground and space-based systems to protect the United States from attack by strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. The initiative focused on strategic defense rather than the prior strategic offense doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD). The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) was set up in 1984 within the United States Department of Defense to oversee the Strategic Defense Initiative.|
|2||The ambitious initiative was "widely criticized as being unrealistic, even unscientific" as well as for threatening to destabilize MAD and re-ignite "an offensive arms race". It was soon derided asStar Wars, after the popular 1977 film by George Lucas. In 1987, the American Physical Society concluded that a global shield such as "Star Wars" was not only impossible with existing technology, but that ten more years of research was needed to learn whether it might ever be feasible.|
|3||Under the administration of President Bill Clinton in 1993, its name was changed to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and its emphasis was shifted from national missile defense to theater missile defense; and its scope from global to more regional coverage. It was never truly developed or deployed, though certain aspects of SDI research and technologies paved the way for some anti-ballistic missile systems of today.|
|4||BMDO was renamed to theMissile Defense Agency in 2002. This article covers defense efforts under the SDIO.
Under the SDIO's Innovative Sciences and Technology Office, headed by physicist and engineer James A. Ionson, PhD, the investment was predominantly made in basic research at national laboratories, universities, and in industry, and these programs have continued to be key sources of funding for top research scientists in the fields of high-energy physics,supercomputingcomputation, advanced materials, and many other critical science and engineering disciplines: funding which indirectly supports other research work by top scientists, and which would be largely unavailable outside of the defense budget environment.
Bombers to ICBMs
Although the Germans put considerable effort into the first surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) after 1943, they did not have enough time to develop operational-level weapons before the war ended.
Their research proved valuable to teams in the US and USSR, where missile programs slowly developed in the immediate post-war era. As the cold war started, the Soviets found themselves facing massive USAF and RAF bomber fleets they could not hope to counter in the air.
|6||In response they dramatically increased their efforts in SAM development, deploying the SA-1 Guildsystem around Moscow as early as 1955. This was followed by the dramatically improved and semi-mobile SA-2 Guideline, a weapon that remains in service in the 2000s. Similar US and UK weapons soon followed. By the late 1950s, as missiles developed both in quality and number, the ability for the US air fleet to penetrate Soviet airspace was increasingly at risk.|
|7||In response, both sides increased their efforts to develop long-range missiles. The Soviets, with no effective bomber force of their own, put considerable effort into their program and quickly brought their basic R-7 Semyorka system into operation in 1959. The US's SM-65 Atlasfollowed almost immediately thereafter. These early examples were useful only for attacking large targets like cities or ports, but their relative invulnerability and low cost provided both sides with a credible force in an era of stiffening air defenses.|
At first it appeared that the ICBM could be countered by systems similar to the ever-evolving SAMs already in operation. The ICBM's high trajectory meant they became visible to defensive radars not long after being launched, which meant that defensive systems would have time to prepare. Although they moved quickly in flight, early re-entry systems slowed dramatically once they reached the lower atmosphere, which gave time for a fast missile to attack it.
|9||By the early 1960s both nations were working on their first anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.
As ABMs were being developed, countermeasures were also being studied. As the systems generally used long-range radars to find and track the incoming warheads, the simplest solution was to add radar reflectors and other decoys to the launch. These took up little room or weight, but would make a radar return that looked like an additional warhead.
|10||This would force the defender to use more ABMs to ensure the "right" object was hit, or wait until they started to re-enter, when the lighter objects would slow down faster and leave the warhead racing ahead. Neither option was particularly attractive in cost terms, generally requiring more and faster missiles.
A better understanding of EMP presented new problems; a warhead set off at high altitudes and long ranges from the defensive missiles could blind the radars, making the incoming warheads only become visible at lower altitudes.